Gary Griffiths, Kevin G. Meeham, and Patrick B. Meeham, and Marian J. Meeham v. J. Dallas Vanwagoner : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
Gary Griffiths, Kevin G. Meeham, and Patrick B.
Meeham, and Marian J. Meeham v. J. Dallas
Vanwagoner : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Roger P. Christensen; Richard L. Evans; Christensen, Jensen & Powell,; Attorneys for Appellants.
Elliott J. Williams; Williams & Hunt; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Griffiths v. Vanwagoner, No. 900595.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3335
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY GRIFFITHS, as guardian 
ad litem for KEVIN G. MEEHAN, 
and PATRICK B. MEEHAN; and 
MARIAN J. MEEHAN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
J. DALLAS VANWAGONER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 900595 
Priority No. 16 
ADDENDUM TO APPELANTS' 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
f 
Roger P. Christensen, #0648 
Richard L. Evans, #1016 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS 
Elliott J. Williams 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 
£ D 
MAY 2 9 ifel 
LERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH r 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY GRIFFITHS, as guardian 
ad litem for KEVIN G. MEEHAN, 
and PATRICK B. MEEHAN; and 
MARIAN J. MEEHAN. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
J. DALLAS VANWAGONER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 900595 
Priority No. 16 
ADDENDUM TO APPELANTS' 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Roger P. Christensen, #0648 
Richard L. Evans, #1016 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS 
Elliott J. Williams 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. BOX 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1987 ) 
HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE 78-14-4 
(30) "Health care" means any act, or treatment performed or furnished, 
or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care 
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, 
treatment or confinement. 
(31) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment, 
care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future 
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 3; L. 1985, ch. ferred to in Subsection (6), was repealed by 
242, § 56. Laws 1953, ch. 94, § 1. A definition of "certi-
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "this fied nurse midwife" now appears in § 58-44-4. 
act", referred to in the introductory language, Section 58-8-9, referred to in Subsection (8), 
means Laws 1976, Chapter 23, which enacted was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 13, § 1. A defi-
this chapter. nition of "practice of dental hygiene" now ap-
Compiler's Notes. — Section 58-13-17, re- pears in § 58-7-1.1. 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Applica-
tion. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the 
injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider 
is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, 
the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left 
in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented 
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because 
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal 
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent conceal-
ment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of 
minority or other legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of 
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associa-
tions and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice 
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries 
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that 
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the 
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion 
of time allowed under former law; but any action which under former law 
could have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of 
this act may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of 
this act. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARY GRIFFITHS, as guardian ad 
litem for KEVIN G. MEEHAN, and 
PATRICK B. MEEHAN; and MARIAN FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
J, MEEHAN, OF LAW AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
J. DALLAS VanWAGONER, Civil No, 89-0900111-CV 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendant. 
This action came on regularly for hearing on September 28, 
1990, before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, presiding. The plaintiffs appeared by and through their 
counsel, Roger Christensen and Richard Evans of Christensen, 
Jensen & Powell, and defendant appeared by and through his 
counsel, Elizabeth King of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
Defendant moved for dismissal of plaintiffs1 Complaint for 
failure to comply with the relevant statute of limitations 
encoded in Section 78-14-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), and 
plaintiffs moved to strike defendant's statute of limitations 
defenses. 
After hearing oral argument and reviewing the memoranda on 
file, the Court now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 27, 1981, Mrs. Marian J. Meehan delivered 
premature twins. 
2. in their Complaint, plaintiffs allege treatment by Dr. 
VanWagoner resulted in brain damage to the twins following 
premature labor and delivery. 
3. The Notice of Intent to Commence a Medical Malpractice 
Action was dated August, 1988. 
4. Since 1976, Utah has adopted a two-year discovery or 
four-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be 
brought unless it is commenced within two years after 
plaintiff or patient discovers or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after 
the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or 
occurrence. 
Section 78-14-4(1), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1976). 
5. In 1979, the Utah Legislature amended this statute of 
limitations as follows: 
The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, 
regardless of minority or other legal disability . . . . any 
action which under former law could have been commenced more 
than four years after the effective date of this act may be 
commenced only within four years after the effective date of 
this act. 
-2 
Section 78-14-4(2), Utah Code Ann, (Supp. 1979). 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This action is a medical malpractice action against a 
health care provider, which is governed by the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, Section 78-14-4(1), et seq., Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended). 
2. The statute of limitations encoded in Section 78-14-
4(1) applies regardless of minority or any other legal disability 
pursuant to Section 78-14-4(2), 
3. Plaintiffs were required as a matter of law to initiate 
their medical malpractice claim within four years after the date 
of the alleged neglect. 
4. Plaintiffs' Complaint, initiated seven years after the 
medical care here at issue, is absolutely time-barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations, 
5. This Court must bow to the presumption of the validity 
of the Legislature's action in amending the applicable statute of 
limitations so as to specifically apply the statute regardless of 
disability or minority. This Court does not presume to second-
guess the Legislature and will, therefore, not assess the 
strength or weaknesses of plaintiffs1 constitutional claims. 
-3-
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, as well as on the memoranda submitted by the parties, the 
Court denies the plaintiffs' Motion to Strike defendant's statute 
of limitations defenses and grants the defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss and orders that plaintiffs' Complaint be, and the same is 
hereby, dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, with each party to bear its own costs. 
DATED this Q-^ 1 day of October, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
23\EKB\ 1022**. 57u\f i ndi ngs. «tc 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MARIE B. VAN WENSVEEN, being duly sworn, says that she is 
employed in the law office of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for defendant J. Dallas VanWagoner, M.D. herein; that 
she served the attached Notice of Entry of Order of Dismissal 
With Prejudice (Case No. 890900111CV, Salt Lake County) upon the 
parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof 
in an envelope addressed to: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Roger P. Christensen, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the jsfck day of December, 1990. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this (j-trf day of 
December, 1990. /~ 
Residing in the state of Utah 
My Commission-Ex©i ires; 
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created and the purposes sought to be accomplished by the 
statute* That is, the classification (in this case abrogation 
of the tolling provisions S 78-12-36(1) for minor victims of 
medical malpractice only) must be directly and rationally 
related to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose. The 
main objectives of Utah's Medical Malpractice Act as set forth 
in S 78-14-2 were to decrease or stabilize the cost of medical 
malpractice insurance and tlereby decrease or stabilize health 
care costs generally; as well as to ensure the continued 
availability of insurance to Utah physicians, and quality 
health care to Utah citizens* 
Appellant has attempted to determine the basis for 
Utah's medical malpractice legislation in 1976 and 1979 without 
success. So far as we can tell, there is none. What little 
legislative history there is for the Act consists of 
self-serving declarations from malpractice insurers that there 
was a 'problem," No explanation for the cause of the problem 
was given the legislators, and the record is devoid of any 
examples from Utah. With regard to the so-called 'long-tail" 
problem with claims of minors, one New York case is cited. 
[Portions of the Legislative history from 1976 are attached in 
the addendum at Tab 8.] 
The only evidence that is available indicates that the 
•long-tail" problem with claims of minors did and does not 
exist in Utah; and that the cost of malpractice insurance 
premiums plays an infinitesimal role in the cost of health care. 
Reliable information about medical malpractice claims 
on behalf of minors in Utah is impossible to come by. 
Malpractice carriers either do not keep or will not divulge the 
information. The only reliable information comes from a study 
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
[hereinafter, "NAIC Report,• See, Tab 10]. That study surveyed 
all closed medical malpractice claims on a nationwide basis 
during the period 1975 through 1978. That, of course, is the 
period during which the alleged Utah malpractice crisis that 
motivated the subject legislation was at its height. The study 
was funded by the insurance industry and the voluminous 
information included came from insurance carriers1 malpractice 
case files. As such, the report is considered the most 
authoritative to date on recent malpractice claims experience 
in the country. 
During the three and one-half year period between 1975 
and 1978, a total of 237 "claims" (not necessarily lawsuits) 
were made against Utah physicians, only 84 of which resulted in 
any payment to plaintiffs. Of those, only four awards were in 
excess of $100,000, and the total of all payments was 
$1,813,452; an average of $21,589 per paid claim, and only 
$7,652 per claim made. [NAIC Report at pg. 121]. During this 
-19-
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exist lh Utah; and that the cost of malpractice /insurance 
premiums plays an infinitesimal role in the cost of/nealth care. 
Reliable information about medical malp/actice claims 
on behalf of\ minors in Utah is impossible to come by. 
Malpractice carreers either do not keep or wiJj. not divulge the 
information. The \nly reliable informatiopr comes from a study 
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
[hereinafter, "NAIC Rej^rt," Seef Tab 1/0]. That study surveyed 
all closed medical malpXactice claims on a nationwide basis 
during the period 1975 thr\ugh 197/. That, of course, is the 
period during which the allVfed/Utah malpractice crisis that 
motivated the subject legislation was at its height. The study 
was funded by the insurance \ndustry and the voluminous 
information included came from insurance carriers1 malpractice 
case files. As such, /the report\is considered the most 
authoritative to date 6n recent malpractice claims experience 
in the country. 
During the/three and one-half year\r>eriod between 1975 
and 1978, a total of 237 "claims" (not necessarily lawsuits) 
were made against Utah physicians, only 84 of w&Lch resulted in 
any payment t/o Dlaintiffs. Of those, onlv four a\ards were in 
excess of/$100,000, and the total of all payments was 
$1,813,4S2; an average of $21,589 per paid claim, Vnd only 
$7,652/per claim made. [NAIC Report at pg. 121]. Durirvg this 
same period of alleged "crisis," Aetna, then the major Utah 
carrier of malpractice insurance, collected over $15,000,000 in 
insurance premiums. 
For minors, the figures for 1975-1978 are as follows: 
total claims - 17 (7.25%), total paid claims - 9 (10.7%); 
average number of months from incident until report for paid 
claims - twelve months, [NAIC Report at pg. 115]. 
Where is the long-tail problem that motivated the Utah 
Malpractice Act so that "liability insurance premiums can be 
reasonably and accurately calculated?" [§ 78-14-2]. The 
long-tail problem, as any reasonable person would expect, was 
and is non-existent. The parents or guardians of an injured 
infant will naturally assert its cause of action as soon as 
possible in most instances. It is only in the very rare case 
where the child's legal injury is not discoverable for four 
years, or where the parents are ignorant or unmotivated that 
infants need the protection of a tolling statute such as 
S 78-12-36(1). Those rare instances will cause no harm to 
insurance companies who routinely grossly 
3That appears to be exactly the type of situation that 
prevailed in this case, as evidenced from the following excerpt 
from Dave Niles deposition: 
Q: Did you share your wife's suspicion in 
1969 that the care she had received from 
Dr. Stone during delivery was not 
appropriate? 
3(Continued) 
/ 
A: A recall her visiting the physrician she 
talkeck about in OB and her comiog home and 
telling, me about the doctor's Comment and 
her noticing that it said/ a normal 
delivery^ I think that we thought or talked 
amongst ourselves of a sense of, if this is 
normal, rJm not sure why ariyone wants to 
continue t\ have babies. Thart was about the 
extent of rt. We did not,/l think, discuss 
that' s abnorWl and we snoi/ld seek some kind 
of leqal 
time in 
really di 
wasn't h 
coi^  
our 
dn't 
igh 
nsel . 
\ lives 
yant 
Mainly 
f 
to 
on our 
it/ 
Qfit 
' because 
was 
into 
yilSt Of 
at 
somethin 
and it 
that 
g we 
3ust 
priorities. 
[Depo. of Dave \Niles/ at 
added)]. 
pg. 16 (empnasis 
And from the deposition of mn Niles: 
Q: Having had (knowledge of Scott's injury) 
for more than ten ye^ ars and having had the 
burden of carinc/ for \scott for all of those 
ten years, can/you teYl me why it was that 
it was 1980 thaft you fi\st saw a lawyer? 
A: Yes, fi/st its a flatter of survival, 
coping day/ by day, an«3 that's not the 
prevalent jching on your W n d at the time. 
Its learnimg to cope with fthe situations and 
the trauina you're going thorough. And that 
went on /tor quite a long time, and also the 
fact th4t not being financially able to do 
anything anyway, to even cal\ a lawyer or 
anyth/ng, and not knowing what\ resources to 
use./ We were young. We were\25. It was 
just: a matter of trying to Wrvive for 
awhile, and we knew absolutely\ nobody in 
innesota] and we were all by ourselves and 
st trying to survive. [Depo. \of Elynn 
iles at 59.] 
after (The Wiles moved to Minneapolis nine day* 
delive/y.) 
overestimate future losses in order to offset investment 
4 income. 
In a document entitled Medical Care Cost Containment 
Proposals, prepared by the Utah State Medical Association in 
March of 1984, (attached in the addendum at Tab 11), the true 
causes of increased health care for the period 1974 thought 
1982 were presented by physicians themselves as follows: 
(a) General inflation - 59% 
(b) Medical care inflation including 
technology (over and above general 
inflation> 11% 
(c) An increasing and aging population 8% 
(d) Modern medical care financing and the 
effect of government health programs 20% 
TOTAL Before Effect of Increased Cost of 
Malpractice Premiums 98% 
What effect, then, has the increased frequency of tort 
claims and average awards had on health care costs? The 
figures and analysis presented by the Utah State Medical 
^By year-end 1983, the Utah Medical Insurance Association 
("UMIA"), Utah's primary malpractice carrier, had paid out a 
total of $2,7 million on claims in its five-year history. 
During the same period it had collected over $15 million in 
premiums, and earned $4.3 million in investment income. Yet, 
for 1983 alone, UMIA claimed $3.3 million in unpaid losses 
(more than its five-year total), to bring its total unpaid 
losses as of the year-end 1983 to over $8.5 million. (Sources: 
UMIA financial statement for 1983, and Best's Insurance Reports 
for property-casualty companies, 1983 and 1984.) Note that 
these disproportionate projections all took place during a 
period when minors' causes of action were statutorily limited 
to a maximum of four years. 
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Association demonstrates that it is negligible, most probably 
less than 1%, and it is not difficult to realize why this is 
so. Malpractice awards and defense costs are paid by insurance 
companies. Insurance companies are not part of the health care 
system, they are independently operated and immensely 
successful businesses which, through issuance of malpractice 
insurance and collection of premiums, play an indirect and 
insignificant role in health care costs. The occasionaly large 
verdicts and settlements that receive a great deal of publicity 
and attention are not health care costs. The only cost to 
health care consumers involved in a million dollar judgment 
against a physician is the premium that physician pays annually 
for malpractice insurance. 
The fact that an alleged medical malpractice "crisis* 
never existed, or abated, was the basis for several states*1 
conclusions that their malpractice acts were unconstitutional. 
In Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978), the North 
Dakota Supreme Court struck down that state's entire 
malpractice act, in part, on the basis of a finding that no 
crisis existed. The court stated: 
The evidence in the case before us, however, 
indicates that either the legislature was 
misinformed or suosequent events have 
changed the situation substantially. [Id. 
at 136]. 
The court in Arneson utilized the intermediate test for equal 
protection analysis. In Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 P.2d 87 (R.I. 
-24-
1893)/ the court utilized the lower-tier rational-basis 
standard in finding its entire malpractice act 
unconstitutional. The court stated: 
Because no obvious crisis exists to support 
the challenged legislation, we shall . . . 
decline to speculate about unexpressed or 
unobvious permissible state interests. 
Absent a crisis to justify the enactment of 
such legislation, we can ascertain no 
satisfactory reason for the separate and 
unequal treatment that it imposes on medical 
malpractice litigants. The statute 
constitutes special class legislation 
enacted solely - for the benefit of specially 
defined defendant health-care providers. 
[Id. at 93]. 
See also, Jones v. State Board of Medicine, (District Court 
findings on remand discussed supra). This court has also 
stated unequivocally that the original factual predicate for a 
statute and any subsequent change from the situation which 
prompted the legislation are relevant to equal protection 
analysis. See, discussion of Malan v. Lewis, infra. 
The evidence available clearly demonstrates that there 
is no factual predicate for the discriminatory classification 
created by S 78-14-4, and that abrogation of minors1 rights 
guaranteed by S 78-12-36(1) will not substantially further the 
objectives of the malpractice act. Therefore, S 78-14-4 should 
be found unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection 
insofar as the statute applies to minors. 
Respectfully submitted this 2H w day of /Mj4itCH , 
1 9 8 5 . 
GORDJpN L. ROBERTS 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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